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Abstract
This study will seek to reevaluate the era which historians have traditionally labeled as
the Gilded Age. It will do this through an examination of the state of civic virtue in the United
States during this period. This will be accomplished through an interdisciplinary foray into
America’s past. From it, hopefully some fresh understandings of what America is, and where it is
going, can become apparent. This project falls within the broader exploration of the relationship
between the citizen and society and will thus hopefully contribute to that set of literature. This
project will be a convergence of several subdisciplines within the field of historical inquiry.
These subdisciplines being social history, cultural history, political history, and intellectual
history. Therefore, the goal of this study is to provide the fullest possible picture of American
civic virtue during this period.

1
Chapter 1: Introduction
It is substantially true that virtue…is a necessary spring of popular government.
-George Washington1
History can be thought of as an arena for the complex and nuanced interplay between the
ideal and the real, theory and action. Furthermore, there is an intricate connection between ideas
and their historical locales. These claims carry with them some major philosophical baggage
which has been discussed ad nauseum throughout much of the course of Western thought. These
problems can be summarized in two basic questions. First, can a causal order be determined
between ideas and material forces, as in which is a product of which? Secondly, can abstract
ideas become instantiated, and thus in a sense, affect, or even steer, reality? As to the first
question, ideas, can, and most often do, seep out of their more closed or academic contexts into
the general consciousness, with profound and often immeasurable consequences. 2 Yet
conversely, ideas themselves can be, and many times are, products of, or reactions to, historical
circumstances or various other social forces which shape one’s very perception of reality. In the
example of Darwinism, the historian Oswald Spengler, as well as the thinker Friedrich
Nietzsche, suggested that as opposed to being a product of dispassionate reason, “…the genesis
of Origin might be traced to Darwin’s own knowledge of the rigors of British industrialism.” 3
Thus, at this point, it seems like the only option is to straddle the fence on this very well-tired
philosophical debate, as one can positively say that the relationship between ideas, historical
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events, and social forces is extremely intricate, and thus each respectively affect each other in a
myriad of ways.
As for this second problem, in the entire course of history there has been only one true
example of the ideal perfectly becoming manifested in the material realm, and that was when the
Word became flesh. Yet humans throughout history, at various levels of fervency, have
attempted to make physical reality correspond to something that is considered ideal. This is
primarily done in the political sphere. On one hand, this can be rather positive, as when the
intrinsically interconnected members of a society come together, albeit imperfectly, and pursue a
common good. Yet negatively, it can morph into the worst forms of totalitarianism, where an
attempt is made to forcibly squeeze all of life into a box constructed by the capricious whims, or
worse the misguided ideas, of those in positions of power.
The question that arises from these previous questions, and that is one of the major
questions of this study, is whether society should be organized towards some end of achieving,
even if imperfectly, an ideal or various ideals, or rather if it should it be organized purely in
accordance to perceivable reality. The question of what constitutes civic virtue, and what that
looks like, is a subsidiary of these larger questions. In the American Gilded Age such questions
were at the forefront, and there was considerable back and forth and confusion as to how to go
forward.
Before this study commences there are several preliminary concerns which must be
addressed. First, the concept of civic virtue needs to be historically introduced and defined.
Next, there needs to be a historical introduction to the Gilded Age itself, establishing the
boundaries and purview of this study. Next there needs to be a brief overview of the historical
literature which discusses American civic virtue, or closely-related subjects, in the Gilded Age.
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Lastly, there must be some philosophical grounding before proceeding to assist in further
clarifying the direction, aims, and scope of this project.
What is civic virtue exactly? This is a term that is relatively foreign to the rhetoric
proceeding from both sides of the present day political binary of left and right. One reason for
this is the ambiguity concerning this concept of civic virtue itself. There is a panoply of
definitions for the civic virtue, as the term is very historically specific. Yet this historical
complexity does not prevent there from being a general definition which serves the purposes of
this work. This definition comes by way of scholar Joyce Appleby, where civic virtue is “…the
quality that enabled men to rise above private interests in order to act for the good of the
whole.”4 This definition encapsulates much the core of the concept of civic virtue, yet some
additional details must be provided to gain a fuller understanding of this concept and how it has
been understood in American history.
Civic virtue is closely tied to the concept of virtue, a term not without its own conceptual
difficulties. A good place to begin in order to see the connection between both concepts is
through a definition of virtue as: one delaying gratification and denying base appetites by means
of carefully cultivated moral habits. For Aristotle, one of the progenitors of the western
conception of virtue ethics, being virtuous is an inner state brought about through such habits. In
this virtuous state, the human being lives on the “...mean between excess and deficiency” and
thus achieves excellence and felicity. 5 Civic virtue consists of importing this inner condition to
the public sphere, but it is also more than that. In classical republican theory, also beginning with

4
Joyce Oldham Appleby. Capitalism and a New Social Order : The Republican Vision of the 1790s. (New York ; London,
New York University Press, 1993.) 14.
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Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics. (London: Penguin, 2004,) 39.
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Aristotle, the citizen is a necessary component of the polis. The polis is a “community of
citizens,” and therefore the citizen’s needs are intricately tied together with the needs of the
common good. In Aristotelian terms, man cannot achieve eudaimonia, or “the good life,” unless
he participates in the polis, since he is by nature “a political animal.” Therefore a more complete
definition of civic virtue would be: specific qualities, habits, or dispositions which citizens must
imbibe, possess, and through which act, in order to be involved in their own self rule and
therefore become more human.
What was the role and position of civic virtue in the American founding and in early
American life? A mostly ubiquitous position among the founders during the Constitutional
process was that the inchoate nation was to be some type of republic. Civic virtue is a necessary
component to the classical republicanism that many of the founders knew well. This is the
historic republicanism that found its roots in Greek thinkers like the aforementioned Aristotle,
and in Roman politicians and historians like Cicero and Tacitus. Republican theory would be
revived during the Italian Renaissance and was popularized in Great Britain during the sixteenth
and seventeenth centuries. Such ideas had great influence on the founding. Lockean liberalism
was also present during the founding, and it was generally understood among the framers that
republics were rare and a short-lived enterprise. Hence there was a tension between liberalism
and republicanism and in many ways the United States was birthed as a product of this tension
between political ideologies. While Liberalism and Republicanism are indeed similar in certain
respects, one of their major differences is on the concept of civic virtue. In fact, these ideologies
are in opposition when it comes to the nature of the citizen and the nature of freedom. Regarding
the nature of freedom, in republicanism, “…freedom is related to participation in self-
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government and concern for the common good.” 6 In liberalism, on the other hand, the
mechanisms of government are in place to maximize individual liberty and personal autonomy.
Thus in Republicanism, the citizen completes his being through participating in his own
governance. Conversely in Liberalism, the citizen works towards his individual highest goods
without infringing on the rights of others to do the same. Obviously, these two ideologies were
not the only ones present during the founding, and were not the only influences on it. In reality,
the American system was a complex fusion of many elements from several ideologies and
traditions.7 Thus although republicanism was not the only influence on the founding, it was still
a major concern of the founders. Littered throughout their writings and speeches are references
to civic virtue and the necessity of a virtuous populace represented by virtuous leaders. 8 For
example, the Virginia Declaration of Rights, a source from which Jefferson drew inspiration in
drafting the Declaration of Independence, declared “That no free government, or the blessings of
liberty, can be preserved to any people but by a firm adherence to justice, moderation,
temperance, frugality, and virtue and by frequent recurrence to fundamental principles.” 9 Yet
such concerns for civic virtue were tempered with pessimistic views of human nature, as many of
the institutional mechanisms of the American system were put in place to check and even
“channel” man’s natural proclivity towards self-interest into more collective ends. 10 In a system
which is driven by directing man’s self interest, true civic virtue can be seen as superfluous. Such
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Iseult Honohan, Civic Republicanism, (London : Routledge, 2002.) 1.
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internal contradictions would become manifest much later in American history. Despite such
contradictions, republican civic virtue did exist in early American life.
This civic virtue that did exist in the United States was most prevalent prior to the Civil
War, and had a very unique character. This visible form of civic virtue was observed by French
political theorist Alexis de Tocqueville and addressed in his tome Democracy in America.
American civic virtue during this period was closely tied to Tocqueville’s observation of the
paradoxical nature of American individualism, what he labeled as “self-interest rightly
understood.”11 Vestiges of this American character would remain during the period of the Gilded
Age, yet there was quite a bit of distortion to it.
It is imperative to address another meaning of civic virtue which is broader and less
conceptionally rigid and more conducive to the Liberal ideology. Civic virtue, by this
understanding, are external actions through which societal members participate in their
community and their government. The primary difference between this more broadly construed
definition of civic virtue and the narrower classical republican one is a matter of action versus
disposition. This can be explained through a comparison of ethical theories, which importantly
are also closely tied to the concept of civic virtue. The broader definition of civic virtue is
focused on action, much like in deontological ethics, wherein all that matters is that a morally
right action is done, regardless of how an individual feels or understands that action. In this
sense, the act of voting itself would be considered civically virtuous. The narrower conception of
civic virtue is similar, unsurprisingly, to virtue ethics. In virtue ethics, as previously discussed,
the focus is less on actions themselves but rather on the cultivation of right habits and
dispositions which contribute to the holistic development of the human being. Similarly,
11
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republican civic virtue focuses less on civic actions themselves but rather on the complete
development of the citizen in proper relation to his political community, as a prerequisite to
human flourishing.
Lastly, these ways of understanding civic virtue can be synthesized through a very
abstract understanding civic virtue, that is more a sentiment than anything else. In this
understanding, civic virtue is an external manifestation of the impulse towards self-governance
properly that is ordered within genuine community. Furthermore, in an Aristotelian sense, civic
virtue is a result of the deep-seated understanding that political participation is necessary for a
full life. This is a sensibility that is the complex result of inherited ideas, historical position, and
psychological predispositions. It is at once individualistic and collectivist, a paradox begat of
America’s dual liberal and republican impulses. These descriptors are by no means absolute, and
there are many different forms of this sentiment. There are those in US history who have, at least
at times, demonstrated this impulse. John Winthrop, Thomas Jefferson, and Abraham Lincoln to
name just a few.
Ultimately, for the purpose of this study, Appleby’s definition of civic virtue as
overcoming private interest for public good will be the primary metric of analyzing civic virtue
during the Gilded Age. Yet these other ways of understanding civic virtue are extremely
important to keep in mind as the study progresses.
In historical study, there are certain metrics which can be used to determine the character
of a certain society at a certain historical period. One lesser used metric is a given society’s
treatment and output of civic virtue. For reasons like the aforementioned definitional ambiguity
and also the difficultly at quantifying it, many social scientists and historians shy away from
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examining any given society’s output of civic virtue.12 Since at least the turn of the twentieth
century, many scholars, particularly in the Anglo-American world, have predicated their research
upon an unquestioned assumption that all of life is in some degree quantifiable. A study of civic
virtue necessarily must reject this presupposition. While exact statistical information may be
lacking, there is still a wealth of resources which provide a rich understanding of what a specific
society’s civic virtue indeed looked like. If one is to not merely examine a certain society
through the reductive lens of quantification and examine it more through a broader scope, it is an
enriching experience, and one can glean much about the nature of American life. The
examination of a society’s civic virtue also assists in elucidating how the relationship between
citizen and state is manifested in a given society. The period in the United States where this
relationship underwent incommensurable change and transformation was the Gilded Age. Thus,
one of the main arguments of this thesis is that the relationship between the American citizen and
the American state was fundamentally altered during the Gilded Age.
Now there needs to be a historical introduction to the era which historians, not without
controversy, have labeled the Gilded Age.13 For this study, the Gilded Age is understood as the
period from the end of the Civil War to the end of the nineteenth century, which is approximately
from 1865 to 1900. During this time America was fundamentally transformed in nearly every
area of life. The rumblings of change that had begun in the pre-Civil War era fully manifested
during this time. The nation went from primarily an agricultural economy into one completely
marked and characterized by industry and technological innovation.

12

Amitai Etzioni, The Monochrome Society, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001,) xiii.
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The label “Gilded Age” famously came from a Mark Twain and Charles Dudley Warner
novel which satirized the excesses of America’s affluent class. “Gilded” is this idea of putting
gold on top of gold as a symbol of the unashamed opulence of many of the wealthy during this
period.14 During this Gilded Age, due to a variety of factors that will be examined, the American
citizen slowly started to become more bewildered and lost in a world that was almost wholly
unlike anything he had previously known. The realities of this era would ultimately deeply
hamper the potential for the cultivation of the “habits of the heart” which would have helped any
American practice civic virtue, and thus in essence, self-govern. 15 Yet paradoxically, calls for
external moral behavior as well as the statistical number of civic organizations and external civic
output somewhat increased during this time.16 These tensions – the growth of external
opportunities for political engagement accompanied by the concurrent declension of actual
citizenly power; and the rise of external morality accompanied with a decline in civic virtue – are
the driving impetuses of this project.
It is important to note prior to going forward that there is a tendency for scholarship that
focuses on this era to be what Howard Mumford Jones has labeled as “moralistic.” 17 Admittedly,
when examining a historical age such as this one, especially through the lens of something like
civic virtue, it is quite easy to engage primarily in critique, especially given the apparent
corruption and excess which characterized much of the period. Jones succinctly encapsulates this
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idea with a rhetorical question, “Who can applaud the Gilded Age?” 18 Therefore, while there are
undoubtably critiques to be made, it is imperative to be discerning and look for explanations
which do not merely confirm such preconceived biases.
One of the primary reasons that this topic was chosen was due to the absence of a
historical monograph on the subject on civic virtue in America during the Gilded Age. Yet, there
is still a considerable amount of scholarship which references civic virtue during this period, and
historians and academics have understood and treated it in disparate ways. This will be a brief
overview of the presence of the concept of civic virtue in the historiographical schools which
could be essentially labeled as the “big players” and therefore is by no means comprehensive, as
many other works will be explored throughout the rest of this thesis.
The main school of thought to be addressed, which primarily reflected the feeling of
unity America experienced in the wake of the Second World War, was the Consensus school. A
well-known article by a Progressive historian, John Higham argued that this school presented an
America much like Tocqueville did in the 1830’s, one wherein the US generally has been “…a
happy land, adventurous in manner but conservative in substance, and—above all—remarkably
homogeneous.”19 Consensus historians downplayed conflict in American life for what
paradoxically was a more nuanced account of the American past. The primary consensus
historian from the left – although being a member of this school is a notion that many scholars
and he himself have sometimes challenged – was Richard Hofstadter. Hofstadter, had several
tremendously influential works could be described as primarily on a “…lifelong quest to

18

Ibid., 9.
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John Higham, "The Cult of the American Consensus." Commentary (New York) 28, (1959): 93.
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comprehend the relationship between politics and ideas in America.” 20 Hofstadter arguably did
not focus on the development of citizenly virtue and civic obligation in his analyses of what he
called American “political culture.” 21 Yet highly related to the subject of civic virtue, especially
in The American Political Tradition (1948), Hofstadter explored the many discontinuities
between American political thought and practice. In this seminal work Hofstadter also
challenging the oversimplified Progressive accounts of American history being characterized by
binary conflict.22 Hofstadter did considerable work on certain aspects of the Gilded Age, namely
what he called The Age of Reform (1955), and discussed civic virtue in the context of the
“Agrarian myth.”23 On the other side of the political spectrum, yet while still being a Consensus
historian, Daniel Boorstin argued, in the first line of a later work of his on the history of
American political theory, The Genius of American Politics, “The genius of American
democracy comes not from any special virtue of the American people.” 24 Boorstin did not see
America as have a shared political ideology besides one that was primarily pragmatic in nature.
The next major school would be that of the New Left. In the 1960s and beyond, as the
American sociocultural milieu experienced titanic disruptions which essentially ripped to shreds
the social fabric which had previously been stitched together in the wake of the second World
War, historical scholarship went in interesting directions. The New Left, inspired by many of the
older Progressive school narratives, focused primarily on conflict. The more contemporary

20
Daniel Joseph Singal, “Beyond Consensus: Richard Hofstadter and American Historiography.”, The American Historical
Review 89, no. 4 (1984): 976–1004. 978.
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schools of thought, finding their origin in certain New Left histories, turned historical focus
towards groups which had previously been marginalized i.e. African Americans, women, and
Native Americans. New Left historians reframed much of the narrative concerning reforms
during the latter Gilded Age and then during the Progressive Era. Instead of viewing these
reforms as anti-capitalist, many of these New Left historians, like Gabriel Kolko, viewed such
reforms as actually being championed by big business advocates in a marriage with centrists in
the government in order “…to stabilize the economy and suppress a radical leftist alternative.” 25
Ultimately, how these various historiographical schools shaped Gilded Age narratives is
imperative to this study.
One cannot embark on a historical inquiry such as this and not address the purpose of the
history itself, or at least the purpose of this specific historical work. Far too often history,
specifically the academic study of history, is treated as merely detached observation of times
past. There is such a limited sense of historical continuity – the notion that the past informs the
present as well as the future – and it seems that much of the use for history is either found in
limited academic circles, as something that is almost a novelty which primarily services the
needs and wants of popular culture. Simply put, and without exaggeration, history is so much
more than this.
Much of the inspiration for this work comes from the late historian and social critic
Christopher Lasch. Lasch, whose writings serve the dual purpose in this work as both rich
scholarly sources and as more general sources of inspiration, saw history differently than these
aforementioned approaches. Lasch decried the widespread loss of this “… sense of historical

25
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continuity.”26 To Lasch, this sense quickly degraded into “…the erosion of any strong concern
for posterity.” 27 Such concerns shaped Lasch’s broader views on historical study, which are best
described in his own words from the preface of The Culture of Narcissism. Lasch writes that
“Far from regarding it as a useless encumbrance, I see the past as a political and psychological
treasury…that we need to cope with the future. 28
Now this idea of using history to face the problems of the present must be made distinct
from the tendency to use history as a emotional tool in order to evoke nostalgia for some
idealized version of the past.29 The formula for such a historical project is rather straightforward:
decry aspects of the present-day US, juxtapose the present with a certain “idyllic” era from the
past, and then call for a return to “those days.” This whitewashing of the past for purely
ideological motives is not the goal or outlook of this historical project. This work, in contrast to
that approach, is attempting to study the past to not only to understand why things are the way
they are now, but also to use its lessons to face the battles of the present. This is not the
absolutizing or idolatrizing the past as which is so often done. 30
Another important idea from Lasch concerning the purpose of history is that there is an
intricate connection between the development of well-rounded citizens, teeming to the brim with
virtue, and the study of history.31 Again, active historical study does not merely serve the
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purpose of providing the student with virtually useless information of a petrified past. Rather it
“…can encourage people to think about broader moral and political questions and to think more
critically about the present.”32
Now a brief preview and guide for this thesis. The question of civic virtue and the Gilded
Age will be analyzed in two primary parts. Chapter 2 will provide an overview of American
society, culture, and general intellectual milieu during the period with an emphasis on how the
changes and shifts in all these areas deeply affected the potential for civic virtue amongst
American citizens. Chapter 3 will examine American political life during the period, with a focus
on the presence, or lack of presence of civic virtue. The final chapter, Chapter 4, will conclude
the thesis through a broad overview of reform movements, with analysis and conclusions
extending into present, along with some thoughts on how the research can move forward.

32

Ibid.
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Chapter 2: Civic Virtue in American Society and Culture During the Gilded Age
Give me neither poverty nor riches;
Feed me with the food that is my portion,
That I not be full and deny You and say, “Who is the Lord?”
Or that I not be in want and steal,
And profane the name of my God.- Proverbs 30:8b-9 (NASB)

America during the Gilded Age experienced various convulsions that altered its society
and culture in ways previously unseen. The main purpose of this chapter will be to discuss the
general state of American civic virtue approximately between the years of 1865 and 1900 in light
of these seismic societal, cultural, and intellectual shifts. It seemed proper to first do an overview
of civic virtue from this broader standpoint of American society and culture and then delve into a
more specific examination of the arena which is downstream of society and culture, politics.
Alongside this discussion of American society and culture will also be an exploration of
American intellectual life during this period, as all these factors mutually affect each other. There
are several questions which will be tackled in this chapter that will be expanded upon throughout
the rest of this thesis. First, what were the causes of such change in American society and
culture? Next, how exactly did they alter American society and culture? Lastly, how did this
changing milieu affect American civic virtue?
In the wake of four years of fratricide, at many times during the Gilded Age there was
“…a real possibility that full scale social chaos was at hand.” 33 Yet by the end of the nineteenth
century, some have argued, America was actually the most unified it had ever been. 34 This seems

33
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to be a dubious claim. If this unity did truly exist, it was more than likely a tenuously composed
synthesis that was a product of various competing and contradictory impulses in American
society which defined latter half of the nineteenth century. 35 The more nuanced truth points to a
reality that resides at the most subterranean depths of the human experience. Hence, another way
of viewing this era would claim that beneath the false unity engendered by a burgeoning mass
culture, American society post-Civil War started to completely fracture, a fracture that would
only continue to fissure with time. These fractures were not merely binary oppositions along the
lines of class, race, or sex as Progressive historians of various eras would claim, but something
far more complex and variegated. The fracturing was within American citizens themselves, many
living with a heart divided, stretched across competing commitments and contradictory impulses.
Furthermore, one could argue that this fracturing of America was in some sense even more acute
than it was during the Civil War. Therefore, if this claim is leaning towards reality it would
render the idea of there being some level of genuine national unity superficial at best, and
propagandistic at worst. Thus, the question is, does this claim hold any evidential weight, and if
so, what was the effect of this condition on civic virtue in American life?
During the Gilded Age, cultural and religious homogeneity, which had been, at least in
principle, main adhesive elements in the ordering of America life, began to dissolve. During his
second inaugural address, Lincoln declared that those on both sides, despite being locked in
mortal conflict, “… read the same Bible and pray to the same God and each invokes His aid
against the other.”36 Yet by the turn of the century, Americans were in a much more confusing
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https://www.nps.gov/linc/learn/historyculture/lincoln-second-inaugural.htm.

17
place. Undoubtably, the Civil War played a major role in this undoing, yet it was absolutely
compounded during the Gilded Age due to a considerable array of diverse factors. This
combination of factors would severely attenuate the American citizen’s potential for the
possession and proper exercise of civic virtue. The first of these factors is the general concept of
modernization.
“Modernization” has become a rather slippery term in academic circles, but it is fairly
clear when referring to what happened in the United States in the latter half of the nineteenth
century. 37 In the United States modernization was primarily the economic transition from
agrarian to industrial, yet there was much more also occurring to mark this transition. 38 Thus
during this period, the United States effectively entered modernity, if not having played a major
role in its creation.39 This period of modernization was as frenzied as it was rapid, producing
various consequences which, characteristic of the American innovative spirit, were not usually
taken into account by those heavily involved in the process while it was being undergone. On
some levels, the fruits of modernization were more ripe than rotten, as in the benefits outweighed
the costs. This is supported by easily quantifiable metrics such as overall mortality rate and
overall wealth level. By this latter metric of total wealth aggregation, the period was the most
prosperous hitherto in American history.40 Yet statistics do not necessarily provide a full
impression of the less savory elements to the modernization process; and they also do not
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provide a complete picture of the effects of the process, as some are less apparent than others.
The more apparent of these consequences, those which reformers and muckrakers tackled with
the most ferocity, were the plentitude of social ills which especially plagued the American cities.
The less apparent consequences were much more difficult to confront – if they could even be
discerned at all. These consequences were much more spiritual in nature, and would often not
become manifest till years later. Specifically, one of these consequences was the altering of the
average American’s potential for civic virtue. The next factor of change to be explored is that of
immigration and its effects on American society and culture during this time.
There are two forms of immigration that will be discussed. The first is the immigration of
ideas. The second is the more commonly understood form of immigration, that of people.
Many have observed that there is almost a natural migration of ideas from Europe to the
United States. Yet, these ideas do not make their nest in the American mind in pure form. The
American spirit makes an indelible impression on everything and everyone that it encounters. On
ideas this impression is particularly strong. European ideas become Americanized as they are
unconsciously either integrated or rejected with the moralistic, practical idealism that is
fundamental to the American mind.41 Yet there is a deeply ironic inversion of this, as the more
intellectually potent aspects of ideas have tended to percolate into the general American Geist
without serious opposition, as a major component of this American Spirit which developed
during this period was a tendency to be uncritical about basic life assumptions. The American
worldview would thus slowly become an assorted amalgam of various and often contradictory
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ideas about the fundamentals of life itself. The true consequences of such a shift would only
become apparent much later.
The promise of America, arguably one of its deepest ideals, is the possibility for not only
new creation but also for the “…realization of everything the others [those in Europe] have
dreamt of – justice, plenty, rule of law, wealth, freedom.” 42 This hope, that dreams which
seemingly never could be fully realized in the old country could now potentially be realized, was
undoubtedly in the hearts of those who made the excruciating decision to sever themselves from
tradition, family, and history, and make their way to what was still the “New World.” Therefore,
a major development during this period which realtered much of the American demographic
landscape was mass immigration. There had been steady foreign immigration in the era prior to
the Civil War – this fact being most exemplified by the considerable amount of first-generation
immigrant soldiers who fought for the Union – from primarily Northern and Western Europe. 43
Yet in the post-Civil War era, the majority of immigrants came from Eastern and Southern
Europe. This change would prove to a dramatic element in the American story, and one that
would be transformative to the trajectory of the American citizen. The effects of this mass
immigration on American civic virtue are closely tied to the concept of “Americanization.”
What did it mean to become an American? During this period and in the early twentieth
century, being at least personally virtuous was something that was presented as fundamental to
the American identity, something that was especially evident in the speeches of Theodore
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Roosevelt.44 Yet, such personal virtue did not necessarily translate into political currency. As
such rhetoric about what truly makes an American citizen increased as a result of the
immigration debate, the actual concentration of political power in the hands of the average
American continued to decline. This was a trend that would continue well beyond the Gilded
Age and the Progressive Era. Hence, the primary governmental response to immigration
essentially sought to “patriotize” and assimilate immigrants. 45 From a more skeptical
perspective, such rhetoric which flowed from this time could be seen as primarily efforts to
condition immigrants into unquestioning producers and consumers, working under the hope of
one day gaining individual riches and accompanying personal assent into a higher stratum of
society or, as popular rags-to-riches novelist Horatio Alger and others like circus magnate P.T.
Barnum would say, the attainment of “fame and fortune.” 46 Yet conversely, it is important to
note that Alger-esqe attributes, which were a descendant of the self-made man philosophy of
Benjamin Franklin, itself a combination of Christian ethics and good business acumen, are
arguably necessary prerequisites to true civic virtue. From this perspective, the incessant
encouragement to practice such personal virtues like diligence, perseverance, respect, selfdiscipline and delayed gratification could be seen as those in power pushing citizens to complete
these first necessary step towards the practice of civic virtue. In other words, practicing such
virtues meant a cleansing of the “…inside of the cup…so that the outside of it may also become
clean.”47
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For some scholars, the primary metric for seeing when various immigrant groups became
more identifiably “American” was through their consumption habits, not their output of civic
virtue.48 While using only such an approach is loaded with assumptions that reduce human
behavior down to economic exchange, there is some considerable merit to this idea. The
acquisition of certain possessions, and therefore having more “disposable income” did generally
demarcate one’s socioeconomic position.49 For example, in the case of many, “The most popular
mark of middle-class attainment was the piano in the parlor.” 50 Thus, the value-determiner of
citizens was more and more becoming their material status.
The next factor to discuss is massive changes in American religious belief that occurred
during this time, as well the changes in what has always been intrinsically tied to religious belief
in America – the life of the mind. Hence, it is imperative to give an overview of the main
intellectual currents which pulsed through the United States throughout this period and their
effect on American civic virtue. There is a distinct nexus between one’s religious disposition and
one’s position towards civic virtue. That is to say that one’s religious beliefs will play in heavily
on how one views civic life.
The history of ideas in the United States is best understood as a series of binary conflicts.
The first, and most fundamental of these conflicts, as described by intellectual historian Morton
White, is “its [the American intellectual tradition] oscillation between doctrines that are
essentially religious, idealistic, or supernatural, on one hand, and the scientific, secular, or
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naturalistic on the other.”51 At its most fundamental it was the conflict of faith versus reason. Yet
there is considerable nuance to this conflict, and therefore it is not so easily clearly distinguished
as one side versus the other, many arguing that the conflict itself is a false dichotomy.
Specifically when looking at this conflict in early American intellectual life, it is important to not
to view it as something where each side was clearly delineated. Furthermore, one cannot treat
that the majority of “…seventeenth- and eighteenth-century European philosophers as if they
were secular philosophers”, as in their historical context, religious questions were intrinsic to
their overall thought.52 Thus faith and reason paradoxically worked both in tandem and in
contrast. Carl Becker argued that up through the Enlightenment the understanding was that
“…reason may be employed to support faith as well as to destroy it." 53 This back-and-forth
relationship between faith and reason would eventually start to shift into something where the
cleavage between the two was clearer, and reason slowly took precedence. In the incipient
United States, particularly among intellectuals, a more “reasonable” faith was what many strove
towards, with obviously some exceptions. For example, In the case of Jonathan Edwards, many
of his contemporaries “…professed and defended Christianity; yet virtually all like [John] Locke
endorsed a broader, more tolerant, and more ‘reasonable’ religion.”54
Yet this shift was not something clear cut, and it never really would be. The complex
reality of this conflict is revealed through the writings of many US intellectuals and prominent
thinkers: this was a conflict that was one waged within man himself, no matter what their public
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positions on such issues were. Therefore, much of American intellectual history can be viewed as
a consistent groping for a rapprochement to this conflict. For many though who were not
necessarily intellectuals, this conflict was resolved rather easily through a reliance on Scottish
Common sense philosophy and the absolute final authority of Scripture. 55 Yet as the nineteenth
century wore on, even the strongest of faiths would be challenged.
Henry May summarizes how an extension of this more general intellectual conflict would
synthesize into the underlying ideology of the American founding. May argues that this ideology
was a compromise between dueling beliefs in “moral certainties” on one hand, and the
“desirability of change and progress” on the other.56
During the Founding, in the view of scholars like Robert Bellah, American religious life
was thought to exist in two separate spheres. 57 The first being one’s public religion, the other
being one’s private religion. Hence, Robert Bellah’s famous concept of the “American civil
religion” is, in this view, was seen as the acceptable form of religion in the public sphere. 58 This
American “civil religion” was in a sense acceptable to even the most skeptical, as it was not
explicitly doctrinal or denominationally specific. Its main tenets were a belief in, “…the
existence of God, the life to come, the reward of virtue and the punishment of vice, and the
exclusion of religious intolerance. Therefore, this “civil religion” was consistent with the
American conception of religious pluralism, as “…all other religious opinions are outside the
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cognizance of the state and may be freely held by citizens.” 59 Within this structure, the very
general and widespread belief was “…that Christianity [or at least its moral traditions] was the
only basis for a healthy civilization…”60 Hence it was also the natural assumption of many that
being morally upstanding and at least nominally being Christian, was necessary prior to being a
good citizen.61 While this latter idea did remain during the Gilded Age, it became evermore
superficial, essentially a box to be checked for someone’s personal well-being. Furthermore, the
challenges of the nineteenth century – a lethal compound of potent ideas and tumultuous
historical circumstances – would cause this American civil religion to become even more
amorphous, eventually degrading it into a set of empty signifiers.
While conflicts of faith were somewhat evident in the years up until the Civil War, they
were overshadowed by the critical importance of the slavery issue. Although, various forms of
conflict did at times boil and spill out in certain religious circles, generally, as in prerevolutionary Europe, Christian belief, at least in the form of “Civil religion” was still
“…something like the sky, from which no man can escape and which contains all that is above
the earth…”62 Yet in the era beyond the Civil War, just as what had happened in Europe in the
prior part of the century, Christianity and religious sentiment as a whole “… became something
like a bank of clouds, a large but limited and changing feature of the human firmament.” 63 In
other words, the natural assumption of the existence of a Monotheistic transcendent power and
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an accompanying created order was no longer a given. One of the primary intellectual causes of
this reality was the widespread influence of Darwinian evolution.
The widespread effects of Darwin’s theories on not only the American mind but that of
the entire globe are truly incalculable. Charles Taylor writes that in the present “secular” age,
“Humans are no longer charter members of the cosmos, but occupy merely a narrow band of
recent time.”64 Darwin’s ideas were not necessarily novel, and had been, pardon the wordplay,
evolving for quite some time. Therefore, Darwin’s publication of On the Origin of Species in
1859 served as the “final terminus” for the “…transformation in outlook from a limited, fixed
cosmos to a vast, evolving universe…” 65 Darwin’s theories provided an immense amount of
additional theoretical justification for a position which arguably many in the American
intellectual tradition had long begun to suspect or even rather long begun to feel: that human
beings were a product of chance and completely alone within a vast, cold, and unforgiving
universe.
While philosophical naturalism is not automatically a result of belief in Darwinian
evolution, certainly many naturalists now had their Genesis. While intellectual movements like
pragmatism attempted to reorient meaning within a new framework, the damage, so to speak,
had been done. There are two specific impacts of Darwinism which will be touched upon herein.
The first impact is the fact that Darwin’s ideas unsurprisingly were extrapolated to
spheres beyond mere biology. Ideas, which can be summarized by phrases which are essentially
colloquialisms today: “survival of the fittest”; “simple to complex”; and “adaption to
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environment” become ways of viewing social and political reality. Collectively, the application
of these Darwinian concepts to social reality became known as Social Darwinism. Belief in
certain forms of Social Darwinism would lead to a more pernicious position that was rather
popular amongst many intellectuals, the belief in selective human breeding, otherwise known as
eugenics. The American eugenics movement did not pick up steam until the 1920’s, but it is
imperative to note how the movement was a consequence of Social Darwinist thought.
The second other impact of Darwinism is less apparent, as it is something which men felt
only in the recesses of their being. This was a burgeoning existential self-awareness which only
confirmed the suspicion that one was cosmically alone, and when he cried out to anyone there
was “…no answer but an echo.”66
Besides Darwinian thought, this reality was also the result of several other factors. The
experience of the Civil War being the most salient of these. The inane carnage of the war, for
many involved in it, defanged earlier religious symbols which had been so securely nestled in the
American mind.67 This would lead to a sentiment that scholar Andrew Delbanco characterizes as
“a stark sense that the world was run by chance.” 68 This feeling of intense uncertainty about the
ordering of the universe, and a thus a general unease about one’s fate, had considerable effects
on American mind during this time, and would deeply affect the ordering of American political
life. Hence, Darwinism provided an intellectual structure for this sentiment of complete
existential and cosmic uncertainty. Cynthia Eagle Russett summarizes this new framework,
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arguing that “The serene cosmic pattern was replaced by the blind movement of mindless forces
eternally sifting and shaping all living things, men as well as the lowliest mollusk towards ends
unperceived and perhaps nonexistent."69
The ramifications of such a change in attitude can only be described as spiritually
transformative. Delbanco continues, “The emergence of chance and luck as the chief
explanations and desiderata of life is perhaps the central story of modern American history…” 70
Now, in a complete reversal of Puritan Calvinism, chance ruled. In the long run, this sentiment
stifled motivation to engage in what potentially could be generations-long “life projects.” 71 This
phenomenon had a deep effect on American civic life. Intellectuals did attempt to counter this
nascent nihilism, yet at many times they attempted to do so without a fixed, transcendent
reference point. The primary philosophy which was a product of such a project was American
pragmatism.
As previously discussed, much of American intellectual life of this era was one of finding
the “via media” between the dueling philosophical positions which defined the American
philosophical mind.72 Pragmatism was also arguably a product of many of these previously
discussed intellectual conflicts, which again had been further heightened in Darwin’s wake.
Pragmatism was a key component of “the American philosophy” which was developed “between
1880 and1920.”73 The major American pragmatist thinkers were Charles Sanders Peirce, John
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Dewey, William James. Each one of these thinkers could arguably be labeled as the greatest
American philosopher. Their pragmatism, as described by the more recent American pragmatist
Richard Rorty, was a philosophical project which “…hoped to save philosophy from
metaphysical idealism, but also to save moral and religious ideals from empiricist or positivist
skepticism.”74 Hence, Pragmatism came about as need for an alternative to what William James
had labeled as the oppositional temperaments of sides of “tough” and “tender” in American
philosophy.75 Those thinkers of a “tender” temperament were more religious and usually were
governed by a belief in an ordered cosmic structure. Those with the “tough” temperament, on
the other hand, were irreligious and governed by “fact.” 76 Pragmatism was born as an attempt to
“satisfy both demands.”77
In pragmatism, especially among these three thinkers, there was limited agreement as to
how exactly this goal was to be completed. Despite differences in the much of the substance of
their thought, pragmatism very broadly can be defined as a philosophy that does what works. In
other words, Pragmatism grounded itself by measuring practical results, as opposed to groundign
reality in correspondence to a theoretical ideal separate from immediate human perception. A
less academic version of pragmatism essentially became the default operating system for many
in American politics and economic life. All activity in these spheres was to be measured by their
practical results. Yet unfortunately, many did not have an adequate lens to interpret these results
through, and thus the “tough” in James’s conception became the more prevailing sentiment as
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there became a manic focus on the proliferation of interpretation-free “facts” a trend that
increased during the Progressive era and has only increased from there.
The emergence of this previously discussed sentiment coincided with the previously
unseen availability of goods once thought to be items of luxury, there now being time
specifically set apart for leisure, and also completely novel forms of entertainment. Therefore,
one of the apparently positive aspects of the explosion of industry in the United States was the
this relatively novel possibility of leisure, or “free time” for at least some in the laboring classes.
Yet it is imperative to note that this was not something necessarily conducive to building an
environment which provides for the possibility of genuine civic virtue. This is not to claim that
any and all forms of leisure are inimical to civic virtue, rather it is an argument that a life
composed only of hard labor and passive entertainment is one that is roughly akin to Jose Ortega
y Gasset’s “Mass Man” or Friedrich Nietzsche’s “Last Man.” This person simply is bereft of any
real sense of purpose, and hence is unable to engage in civic life. One could go further and argue
that the practice of civic virtue is a less a guard from dangers posed by a tyranny from without,
but rather a guard from what the novelist Aldous Huxley would refer to as “…man’s almost
infinite appetite for distractions”, which therefore is more a tyranny from within. 78 The danger
which comes from being fully immersed in all things trivial is a danger that the social critic and
media ecologist Neil Postman warned about most presciently in his classic work Amusing
Ourselves to Death. Yet that is not to say that all of the options for leisure time during this time
were completely vacuous and trivial. The emergence of “Chautauqua” camps presented a
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competition to Vaudeville, with the former encouraging recreation and family activity, and the
latter being primarily base entertainment.
As the century neared a close, the sentiments felt deeply by many of those in both Europe
and the United States at the turn of the century, were that of discontent and ennui. The period
wherein these were strongest-felt and most widespread has been labeled by scholars as the fin de
siècle, which just is simply French for “end of century.” Once industrialism became more refined
and its fruits were starting to become more physically evident, those especially in middle or
upper class positions were utterly beset by the banality of their lives which begat boredom. Life
solely directed towards the pursuit and attainment of material prosperity failed to squelch the
human gnawing for a meaningful existence. Monetary pursuits, which had in many ways become
a substitute for the role of traditional religion, and the extreme insecurity caused by an
unforgiving, impersonal market, yielded despair. This was something that frightened various
intellectuals and political leaders. Victorian culture in its attempts to “…humanize the emergent
industrial-capitalist order by infusing it with a measure of social responsibility, strict personal
morality, and respect for cultural standards” unfortunately could only ameliorate mostly just the
symptoms of this deeper spiritual malaise.79 Something had to invigorate this stolid Victorian
conception of life which could not fully satisfy man’s natural “..urge to heroism.” 80 Christopher
Lasch argues that, “By the end of the nineteenth century, the decline of heroism had become a
common relent.”81 Society was increasingly becoming filled by “Men without chests,” or
essentially those who were virtually incapable of true “virtue and enterprise” since all that really
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was left to justify existence in liberal, industrialized society was the basic utilitarian principle of
pleasure maximization and pain minimization.82 Yet the opportunity to counter this malady was
found in the pursuit of the martial virtues which had essentially laid dormant since the Civil War.
Lasch continues, “Cut loose from religious moorings, however, the defense of the strenuous life
degenerated into a cult of sheer strength.” This conception of virtue would fit aptly with the
previously discussed concept of Social Darwinism. Many co-opted “…the heroic ideal into the
service of militarism, jingoism, imperialism, and racial purification.” 83 Such calls helped to turn
American attention outward, beyond the American continent.
Even William James, a major progenitor of another attempted panacea for this crisis, the
one that would eventually triumph84 – the therapeutic conception of life – also joined the called
for the revival of the martial virtues such as “…order and discipline, the tradition of service and
devotion, of physical fitness, unstinted exertion, and universal responsibility.” 85 Yet James put
an interesting spin on this idea in his influential 1906 essay, The Moral Equivalent of War. James
was in agreement concerning the nation’s lapse in such virtues, which he believed were
“…absolute and permanent human goods.”86 Yet for James, who was a pacifist, rather than the
pursuing kinetic wars he argued that societies must pursue projects that, while not necessarily
war, maintain these indispensable virtues. James declared that the “Martial virtues must be the
enduring cement” which prevents nations from becoming merely playgrounds wherein pleasure
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and comfort are the highest good, something which no civilization can long endure. 87 This was
a fascinating take on civic virtue, and one to keep in mind as this study continues.
Lastly, there will be a brief discussion the nature of familial life during this period; more
specifically the changes wrought in family life due to industrialization. This is imperative to
address as proper and harmonious familial relations are a prerequisite to a flourishing civic life.
What were the effects of industrialism on the family? Lasch argues that a major result of
industrialism, with the natural accompaniment of the “…decline of house-hold production and
the rise of wage labor…” led to relatively novel conception of “…the family as a private retreat
from a public world increasingly dominated by the impersonal mechanism of the market.” 88
Lasch continues, arguing that this state of affairs produced “ambivalent emotions.” 89 “On the one
hand, they wanted the comforts and conveniences furnished by industrial progress; on the other
hand, the agency of progress – the capitalist market – appeared to foster a type of acquisitive
individualism that left no room for the finer things in life: loving-kindness, spontaneous
affection.”90 This was reflective of some of the larger themes that have been discussed thus far.
For many the changes of this era fostered a condition of deep ambiguity concerning numerous
issues, establishing many conflicting visions towards what the “good life” meant. Unable to find
answers, many subconsciously retreated and burrowed themselves into triviality.
The primary result of all these discussed factors was a growing mass of citizens whose
sense of civic duty was becoming quite diluted. In this confusion, citizens were becoming further

87

Ibid.,

88
Christopher Lasch and Elisabeth Lasch-Quinn, Women and the Common Life : Love, Marriage and Feminism. (New
York: W.W. Norton. 1998,) 94, 95.
89

Ibid., 94, 95

90

Ibid.

33
detached from the centers of American power. Ironically though, it has been fairly well
documented that civic participation, especially at the turn of the century and beyond, had actually
increased in major respects.91 It is important to note that these forms of civic participation are
more an example of the second definition of civic virtue which was introduced in Chapter One.
This type of civic virtue had a seismic increase during this era. Clubs and social organizations of
all types cultivated a high degree of “civic life” which had been conspicuously absent from the
lives of many in the era after the Civil War.92 These were organizations, similar to the previously
discussed “Chautauqua” camps, sought to recoup the communalness which had been an
unfortunate victim of American modernization.
The question to be answered in later chapters is, did such organizations inculcate the
habits, dispositions, and character needed for self-governance? In other words, did such
organizations foster true civic virtue? Also additionally did they recuperate any of the political
power which the common man had been progressively losing? There is not a simple answer in
regard to the question of if such organizations fostered true civic virtue. On one hand it is
undeniable that there was a positive communal affect from such organizations, 93 yet on the other
hand, perhaps besides organizations created by the American farmers who would become the
Populists as what will be seen in Chapter 3, these organizations did not necessary empower the
citizen in the grander sense specifically in his relationship to political power
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Chapter 3: Civic Virtue in American Politics During the Gilded Age
The average citizen must be a good citizen if our republics are to succeed.
-Teddy Roosevelt94
A revolutionary age is an age of action; ours is the age of advertisement and publicity.
Nothing ever happens but there is immediate publicity everywhere. In the present age a
rebellion is, of all things, the most unthinkable. Such an expression of strength would
seem ridiculous to the calculating intelligence of our time –
– Søren Kierkegaard from The Present Age: On the Death of Rebellion
The effects of the American Civil War, industrialism, and the general political
happenings of the Gilded Age would eventually bring about new and centralized mechanisms of
control that were seemingly necessarily to bring order to the chaos which modernity had
wrought. Civic virtue, seen as the means for citizens to properly govern themselves, would
unfortunately absent from this arrangement. Furthermore, during this period, the ordinary man
would begin to lose his proximity to the engines of political power in the United States.
The advent of untrammeled industry did not merely deepen class division in the United
States, as one could argue it actually introduced the concept of “class” itself into the American
consciousness.95 There had always been some level of material inequality in the United States,
yet, prior to this era, as historians and political philosophers like Christopher Lasch and Michael
Sandel would come to argue, class distinction were not so clearly demarcated as there are the
present, with the obvious exception of chattel slavery. 96
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One of the main American ideals was that of a relatively egalitarian society, that stood in
stark contrast to the ancient class structures of Europe. Such structures had been a cause of strife
and disunity within these nations throughout the eighteenth century, culminating in the French
Revolution. This egalitarianism though was not, as scholars like Lasch would argue, a complete
social leveling process, and thus contained two crucial elements. 97 First, a somewhat equal
distribution of property, as property ownership is an essential to a free society; and second, the
democratization of the intellectual life.98 Hence both of these elements helped to establish
conditions for the flourishment of civic virtue. During the time of the Gilded Age and beyond,
these ideals were beset with considerable challenges.
During the period the US was flooded with those who were endowed with exorbitant
amounts of “new money.” Wealth for wealth’s sake had been anathema for many of the
Founders, and for good reason. Those who had “new money” lacked civic virtue as they were
able to abscond from reality and “the other half,” 99 and disconnect themselves from older and
more traditional forms of civic obligation. Lasch argues that those who had belonged to the class
of “old money” generally had realized the civic and communal responsibilities that necessarily
came with having any level of fortune.100 Many of the “new money” elites had no such
conception. Mark Twain’s description of this period as gilded – gold upon gold – did therefore
live up to its name in many ways. The infamous Vanderbilt Gala was a major example of this, as
in America prior to this time, such brazen displays of opulence were almost unheard of.
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The nation’s elite class, which again in previous times in the nation’s history had been
more inclined to pursue virtue in the service of the common good, became tragically derelict of
their civic duty. The new elite class, Thorstein Veblen’s “leisure class”, became rather
unconsciously disjointed from older forms of civic duty and preferred life in insular worlds of
luxury, comfort, and immediate self-gratification.101 Yet this reality does not in any way exalt the
poor as a virtuous, under-trodden class, in fact, many of those in poverty would have done no
differently had their fortune been reversed. A primary example of this was Andrew Carnegie.
The problem therefore was not necessarily the extreme wealth inequality, but the fact that
attainment of wealth itself had become the prime metric for success and prosperity in life in the
United States.102 Now some historical interpretations of the period do portray figures like
Andrew Carnegie and Standard Oil’s uberwealthy John D. Rockefeller as messianic figures who
lavishly spent the majority of their fortunes on a cornucopia of philanthropic endeavors.
Carnegie himself, presaging a belief that would much later be espoused by influential thinkers
like Ayn Rand, famously argued that, “Not evil, but good, has come to the race from the
accumulation of wealth by those who have the ability and energy that produce it.” 103 From his
individualist calculation, within the framework of belief in ironclad economic natural laws,
Carnegie propagated a specific, yet warped conception of civic virtue.
In Carnegie’s view, the one who has gratuitous wealth should divvy it out to whichever
project he deems would be beneficial to his larger brotherhood of mankind. 104 While ostensibly
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this seems like the natural thing for the affluent, who is also virtuous, to engage in, it is not the
same republican civic virtue. Carnegie’s system is one which excuses the man of wealth from
civic obligation, rather leaving it up to his own capricious will to decide what to do with his
fortune. Hence, it relieves him from have to engage in more difficult forms of civic participation
that require more than capital investment. Rockefeller held similar convictions and did even
more philanthropy than Carnegie, but similarly it was not civic virtue per se, as arguably it was
completely on Rockefeller’s terms. Therefore, while certainly both figures, as well as several
others, did certainly engage in various levels of philanthropy, it was still far from historical
versions of civic virtue.105
Industrialism led by these “Captains of Industry” urbanized the United States. Cities were
the center of these new living patterns. These cities, as exposed by many muckrakers, were not
close to anything utopic, as was the original promise of industrialism. Lewis Mumford argued
that, “Industrialism, the main creative force of the nineteenth century, produced the most
degraded urban environment the world had yet seen; for even the quarters of the ruling class
were befouled and overcrowded.”106 He furthermore argued that “…the bankers, industrialists,
and the mechanical inventors…were responsible for most of what was good and almost all that
was bad” in the creation of this “..new type of city…” 107 The picture one can paint of such cities
during this period is rather bleak. One can envision the striking juxtaposition of the modern and
the premodern tenuously coexisting during this period. Towers of black smoke billowing over
primitive landscapes, horses carrying wealthy industrialists, and skyscrapers built on dirt roads.

105

Christopher Lasch, The Revolt of the Elites: And the Betrayal of Democracy. (1st ed. New York: W.W. Norton,) 1995.

106

Lewis Mumford. The City in History : Its Origins, Its Transformations, and Its Prospects, by Lewis Mumford. (New
York: Harcourt, Brace And World. 1961.) 441.
107

Ibid., 447.

38
No doubt the American citizen was in a brave new world. How did American politics fit within
this brave new world, what was the place of citizen, and was there any semblance of civic virtue?
An apt definition of the word “politics” during this period came from Ambrose Bierce, a
popular journalist and Civil War veteran, in his satirical lexicon, The Devil’s Dictionary: “A
strife of interests masquerading as a contest of principles. The conduct of public affairs for
private advantage.”108 As this definition implies, during this time, politics became more
associated with corruption, and in a general sense it was developing into just another opportunity
for self-aggrandizement and monetary enrichment. Lincoln Steffens, in his famous muckraking
indictment of American politics argued that in this period “…politics is business. That’s the
matter with it.”109 This was a change from earlier forms of American political life, or at least
how it was understood. John Patrick Diggins argues, “Politics itself, the traditional domain of
virtuous citizenship, had become almost a commercial activity in which votes are bought and
sold.”110 Thus during the Gilded Age, political participation could not be considered as
practicing civic virtue. Often, involvement in politics was merely an expression of partisan
loyalty, akin to a form of tribalism.
The politics of the Gilded Age were thus heavily party centric, but it was not necessarily
heavily ideological, as division came primarily from geographical position, not abstract ideals. 111
This was generally the case except for the constant proclivity of politicians to capitalize on
sentiment from the Civil War, a phenomenon known as “waving the bloody shirt.” 112 Thus, each

108

Ambrose Bierce, The Devil's Dictionary (Project Gutenberg,)

109

Steffens, Lincoln. The Shame of Cities. (New York: McClure, Philips, and Co.1904,)

110

John Patrick Diggins, "Republicanism and Progressivism." American Quarterly 37, no. 4 (1985): 572-598. 573.

111
Goodwyn, Lawrence. The Populist Moment: A Short History of the Agrarian Revolt in America. New York: Oxford
University Press, 1978. 8.
112

Ibid.

39
party firmly ensconced themselves on either side of fairly straightforward issues where
difference had more do to sectionalist concerns more than anything else. 113 One could go further
and argue that the politics of this age were more an exercise of disparate interests maintaining
their own microcosmic fiefdoms while jostling for more influence in the higher echelons of
American power. The party bosses themselves “…rarely held public office,” an indication of the
abundancy of corruption. 114 There were many layers to this corruption.
At the more municipal and regional level, magnates, or “party bosses,” such as the
infamous “Boss Tweed” ran well-oiled machines like Tammany Hall which were primarily
mechanisms for personal gain. Yet ironically, these organizations offered the American citizen,
who now was most likely much more diverse in his ethnicity, cultural background, and beliefs,
an opportunity to be closer to the levers of power, albeit through all sorts of unscrupulous
political chicanery. Hence, “The immigrants brought from their peasant villages the conception
that politics was a personal affair; government was vested in the power local ruler who could
help or hurt you. In the district Tammany chieftain, the newcomers found a replica of the kind of
authority they had respected in Europe.” 115
This was the complexity of such corruption, as true civic virtue became less possible and
national politics became more and more defined by spectacle, local politics, in New York City
for example, was “…to most New Yorkers…[about what a] leader could do for you, not his
party’s stand on some ‘fool’ issue.”116 As many political issues were becoming more and more
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disconnected from the harsh realities faced by ordinary citizens, especially in urban centers like
New York City, Tammany seemed to offer the best practical solutions. The Tammany solvent for
such issues was a mixture of American common-sense philosophy and European village “quid
pro quo” politics, combined with the unabashed pursuit of self-interest. This was an odd
inversion of Tocqueville’s famous concept of Americans living by “…self-interest rightly
understood.”117 Thus, while there is no doubt that those in Tammany engaged in copious
amounts of corruption, their political workings almost represented a new form of civic virtue.
A primary example of a practitioner of this skewed form of civic virtue was George
Washington Plunkitt, the purely political man. “Politics was a way of life for him. In books he
had no interest, and it is doubtful if he ever read one in his long life.” 118 Overall, in politics, civic
virtue was becoming indistinguishable from civic vice.
It is imperative to ask if overall, national politics during this period was active or
inactive. The more popular view among historians is the latter, but there is some evidence which
gives heavy weight to the former. It truly depends on one’s definition of active, or inactive,
regarding the US federal government. On one hand, during this period the US federal
government actively suppressed labor uprisings with a level of violence towards US citizens
almost unseen both previously and thereafter.119 On the other hand, relative to the later
Progressive Era legislation and the legislation of the New Deal the federal government really did
not do that much. That word “relative” is important. In comparison to their successors, Teddy
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Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson, presidents during the period hardly wielded executive power,
as many political historians argue that Congress was the more powerful of the branches during
this period.120 Yet this did not mean that the executive branch did nothing, as there was also a
level of corruption in these higher levels of American power, especially during the Grant
Administration.
While Ulysses S. Grant did have his share of scandals famously revealed in detail by the
likes of Henry Adams, the more important part of the Grant Administration for this study is the
disposition of Grant himself, which is a better reflection of the state of civic virtue during this
period than the more obvious examples of political corruption. 121 Andrew Delbanco argues that
Grant embodied the “organizational” man, completely a product of modernity. During the Civil
War, Grant had found his place in the machine, as since he previously had “…no ground for faith
in himself or in anything beyond himself, he was entirely at home in the modern mechanized
world of war where he found a comforting anonymity.”122 Grant is an excellent example of the
effects of the Civil War on the American spirit and way of life. 123 The war had wrought
“modern” American attitudes.124 Everything, including human relationships, became much more
mechanistic as, “Postwar life continued to honor the military mode.” 125 Thus, in a larger sense,
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as politics followed this mode and became increasing mechanistic, issues like corruption were
only viewed as serious issues if they interfered with the efficiency of the governmental machine.
Congress, which again was arguably the more powerful institution during this time, also
saw its share of scandal and corruption. While that is not to say that the entire enterprise was a
den of deceit and vice, during this time, the “common” interest was further being replaced by
“special” interests. One of the main causes of this would be the reality of corporate industry
becoming increasingly entangled with the US federal government, arguably a relationship that,
as will be seen in later chapters, has only progressed.126
There was no shortage of suspicious economic dealings, the total effects of which being
unknowable, that occurred during the period. Many social critics and eventual reformers saw this
as a serious malady to the health of American society. One example of an economic practice rife
with moral haze was the practice of speculation. Land speculation had always been a major part
of American economic life, a trend that continued during the Gilded Age, with varied results.
Henry Adams, in describing some members of the increasing speculator class, of which one of
the more unsavory characters in American history, Jay Gould, belonged, argued that they,
“…understood no distinction between right and wrong in matters of speculation, so long as the
daily settlements were punctually effected.” 127 The wealth inequality created by rapacious forms
of speculation engendered one of the most influential books of the Gilded Age, Henry George’s
Progress and Poverty.128 George saw that eliminating poverty would be impossible in the present
system of private property that was continually abused by speculators and unjust landlords. He
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believed that “The right of ownership that springs from labor excludes the possibility of any
other right of ownership.”129 In other words, George’s main argument was that speculative
property ownership was not only unjust, but unnatural. 130 Yet for George, reform would have to
be done within the capitalist system, as any suggestion of overthrowing capitalism itself and
replacing it, immediately associated would make with socialists or worse, the anarchists.
George’s solution was a tax on “unearned wealth” – privately owned land that serves no other
purpose other than speculative value.131 While this work had considerable effects on later
reformers, its ideas did not gain mainstream political support.
One potential contrary fact to this narrative of political corruption thus far was the
passing of the Pendleton Act, a major piece of civil service reform legislation. In an attempt to
counter patronage, known more popularly as “The Spoils System,” this act was passed in order
to have many of the positions in the federal government filled on the basis of merit as opposed to
party loyalty. The Spoils System had initially been hailed as something democratic, yet in a
country lacking civic virtue it was destined for corruption. Unfortunately, its replacement, a
professional civil service, would not necessarily be an improvement, and would establish a
separate class of disinterested bureaucrats, thereby assisting in further separating Americans
from their government.
The corruption of this era, which again was witnessed at nearly every political level, did
engender responses and some initial reform. Initial exposure of such corruption was through both

129
Henry George, Progress and Poverty: An Inquiry into the Cause of Industrial Depressions and of Increase of Want with
Increase of Wealth. (Fiftieth anniversary ed. New York: Robert Schalkenbach foundation, 1940,)

2001.) 83

130

Ibid.

131

Gary J. Dorrien, The Making of American Liberal Theology. (First ed. Louisville, Ky: Westminster John Knox Press,

44
print and cartoon, especially from Harper’s Weekly’s famous Thomas Nast.132 While in one
sense such exposure caused the downfall of characters like the ignominious Tweed, and also
brought to the light the sins of those in the Grant administration, these exposers also contributed
to a parallel development in American political life: the transformation of American politics
from something more grounded in everyday reality to something that could only be characterized
as sensationalized spectacle. Such growing obsession with spectacle is also demonstrated by
attempted reforms in general public morality by the likes of Anthony Comstock. While
ostensibly contributing to the increase of public virtue, and thus civic virtue, the unintended
effect of Comstock’s dogged attacks on immorality in American society was that they “…sold
newspapers.”133 Salacity was a hot commodity, as were tales of political vice and corruption. The
glut of media produced on such subjects would cause Americans to grow numb to injustice, and
in some sense it would stilt them from real action as it became nearly impossible to distinguish
“…pseudo-events for real events.”134
As exemplified by Edward Bellamy’s best-selling novel Looking Backward, many
reformers of the age were enraptured by the thought of utopia, or that the present economic and
social conditions were only temporary, and therefore could be overcame and replaced with
something far grander. This would prove to be rather difficult to accomplish in practice. This
first series of reformers presaged the later Progressive Era reformers.
Prior to discussing such reforms, it is first important to discuss two political movements
which sprung up partially in direct reaction to the period’s political landscape. These movements
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were the Labor Movement and the Populist Movement. For the purpose of this study both of
these movements will be examined with civic virtue in mind. In other words, a few questions
naturally arise given the nature of this study. First, could these movements be labeled as genuine
attempts to resuscitate American civic virtue? Prior to answering this question there must be
some additional context to provide a fuller picture of the American political and economic
landscape during the period.
The labor movement began almost immediately with the start of the industrial revolution
in the United States. Prior to the Civil War, the core of their argument was that wage labor, or
“wage slavery” was actually more unjust than chattel slavery, and additionally that it utterly
prevented true civic virtue. In fact, during the pre-Civil War debates over the slavery issue,
“Central to the proslavery was an attack on Capitalist labor relations.” 135 Thus the wage question
must be thrust to the forefront when examining the American labor movement’s effect on civic
virtue.
As more labor unions began to form in Post-Civil War America, the early rhetoric of
those that would become its more radical leaders seemed to point towards pursuing the end of
being self-sufficient virtuous citizen. Both Sandel and Lasch argue that initially the labor
movement saw freedom as being financially independent, yet eventually, and not without
considerable controversy, labor freedom became defined as the freedom to enter into a fair
agreement with an employer.136
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Hence, earlier labor rhetoric resembled that of classic republicanism. For example, in
1884, Eugene V. Debs who would later become the most famous socialist in American history, at
the time a member of the Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, wrote that the primary reason for
attaining any monetary success was only if it could help “…sharpen…his intellect, broaden… his
powers, and develop… him into a self-reliant, powerful member of society for its good.” 137 It is
interesting to track the ideological movement of Eugene Debs. As with many others during the
period he heavily criticized the wage system, yet this would be position which would eventually
lead him to socialism. Debs would eventually frame the labor struggle between laborer and
capitalist as a battle for the soul of the nation, he argued that,
The conflict is not between capital and labor, between money and misery, cash
and credit, it is between man and man, the man who works and the man who pays, the
man who employs and the man employed. It is between the man who holds the office and
the man who holds the ballot. It is a conflict between right and wrong, truth and error,
justice and injustice, a conflict between citizens who make everything, build everything
and the men who simply supervise and manage.” 138

Eventually, radical positions on the wage system took a backseat in mainstream
American labor rhetoric, and thus the wage question faded in importance to those in the labor
movement, and by the turn of the century the wage system was almost universally accepted. 139
The labor movement thus thrust its attention and energies towards the improvement of wages and
of working conditions, versus previously having concentrated opposition to the abolition of the
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wage system carte blanche.140 The more radical portion did still exist but it was turning towards
international socialism.
In some manner, the Populist movement took over where aspects of the labor movement
had left off. In fact, Christopher Lasch drew a link between the earlier discussed labor movement
and the Populist movement in that he regarded the agrarian version of populism as part of a
broader movement that appealed to small producers of all kinds.” 141
Some historians have argued that the Populist movement was the last true instance in
American history of a unique, grassroots movement which actually threatened the established
political order.142 Yet there is not full consensus on this claim, as there is considerable historical
debate surrounding the nature of Populist Movement and of those who were involved in it. Much
of this debate stems from Richard Hofstadter’s seminal work The Age of Reform. On one side,
there are those who argue that the Populist movement was a reactionary movement, an especially
popular claim in the wake of the Trump movement, as many like to point out the parallels
between the two movements. Historians who argue this side claim that Populism was primarily a
nativist reaction towards the influx of immigrants which seemingly threatened not only the
livelihood of many poor whites, but also posed a threat to their religious beliefs and racial
homogeneity. Furthermore, such historians in this camp claim that there was also a virulent
antisemitic and conspiratorial, or “paranoid,” streak amongst the Populists which tainted their
ostensibly noble goal of economic freedom. 143 On the other side of this debate, historians argue
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that the Populists were actually the progenitors of the Progressive movement, and thus were not
reactionary, but rather possessed “forward-thinking” positions on various issues such as
women’s rights and racial justice.144 There is some level of truth to both of these viewpoints, but
neither tell the full picture, and each is tainted by present day political rhetoric.
As previously mentioned, one could argue that all the works on American Populism have
by some degree been in response, either positive or negative, to Richard Hofstadter’s The Age of
Reform. One cannot underexaggerate the groundbreaking nature and the profound influence of
this work.145
Before moving on to Hofstadter’s views on the Populists themselves, it imperative to
discuss Hofstadter’s overall position towards the “Agrarian vision” in American life, as one it
provides excellent context to the Populist movement. Hofstadter attributes the American
idealized vision of Agrarian life being the only true source of civic virtue as a result of several
trends. He argues that “The more commercial this society became…the more reason it
[Americans in rural areas] found to cling in imagination to the noncommercial American
values.”146
For this study a major question arises, were the Populists correct in claiming that civic
virtue was truly only possible in an Agrarian context? In other words, was true American-style
self government only possible if the citizens were yeoman farmers? Even if this not fully the
case, there is an extremely potent sentimental quality to this argument, especially for anyone who
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has truly experienced the dehumanizing effects of participation in the “rat race.” Yet as with
most idealized, nostalgic, and utopic visions, there is a more complex side to story.
Hofstadter attributes the origins of the Agrarian myth not to agrarians themselves but
actually to “…the upper classes of those who enjoyed a classical education, read pastoral poetry,
experimented with breeding stock, and owned plantations or country estates.” 147 Hofstadter
argues that the more real elements of this Agrarian myth began to fade as the independent,
yeoman farmer slowly became the commercial farmer, arguing that: “What developed in
America was an agricultural society whose real attachment was not to the land but to land
values.”148 The act of speculation, which arguably is something more abstract, became entangled
with farming, which by all accounts is one of the most material activities man can engage in, an
intense physical back and forth with God’s earth. Hofstadter argued that “Cheap land invited
extensive and careless cultivation. Rising land values in areas of new settlement tempted early
liquidation and frequent moves.”149 The mindset change imbued many American farmers with a
nomadic spirit that “…too often…[gave the farmers]…little chance to get to know the quality of
their land.”150 There were more far reaching consequences of this phenomenon where farmers
now “…neglected [crop] diversification for the one-crop system and ready cash.” 151 These
developments leads Hofstadter to claim that overall, “The United States failed to develop…a
distinctive rural culture.”152 While in some sense this claim could be viewed as overblown given
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the latter popularity of civic organizations like the Grange or the popularity of Chautauqua, one
could also go as far to say that such organizations would not have been necessary if American
rural culture had been established more organically. While Hofstadter’s generally negative view
of American agrarian life is exaggerated in some sense, it is important to keep in mind in the
broader picture of this study.
This leads to Hofstadter’s overall critiques of the Populist movement itself. Hofstadter
challenged the narrative of there being a seamless causal link between Populism and
Progressivism. Hofstadter also deviated from previous historical interpretations of Populism in
that he did he did not just blithely portray the Populists as “…as victims of industrialization, the
human casualties of an inhumane process,” but rather he attempted to examine them in a more
nuanced manner.153 He did though concede that the Populists “… experienced real economic
reverses, but the essence of their protest lay in the quiet but constant recession of public affection
and respect.”154 Hofstadter also harbored a deep distrust of what Tocqueville had labeled,
“majority tyranny,” which was the proclivity of unruly anti-intellectual masses, blinded by pure
sentiment, to corruptly wield absolute power. Two of his most famous concepts, antiintellectualism and the paranoid style, were in part extensions of this core idea.
The latter of these concepts, “The paranoid style in American politics” was charge that
Hofstadter leveled against many of the Populists given their acerbic criticism of financial
elites.155 This “paranoid style” was the perpetual belief that America is constantly under threat by
“…the existence of a vast, insidious, preternaturally effective international conspiratorial
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network designed to perpetuate acts of the most fiendish character.” 156 While the Populists did
display some signs of this, there was actually a high level of truth in their accusations, and their
criticism was not as conspiratorial as Hofstadter depicted it. 157
Ultimately, some scholars depart from Hofstadter’s charges of anti-intellectualism and
paranoia on the Populists, rather claiming that they “…embodied a remarkable intellectual
enterprise.”158 This view, which is arguably much more popular, aligns the Populists with
progressivism.
Therefore, the interpretive confusion and disagreement over the Populist movement
makes it difficult to see their affect on American civic virtue. Did, on one hand, the Populists
either consciously or unconsciously presage the Progressive movement, or were they something
altogether different? Hence it is imperative to examine the rhetoric of the movement but also the
reactions to the movement during the period itself, specifically the more conservative response.
The best example of this more-conservative reaction against the Populists is usually given
to an 1896 editorial written in The Emporia Gazette by its owner William Allen White. Entitled
“What’s Wrong with Kansas”, White compares the eponymous state to other more prosperous,
and well-to-do states, ridiculing the Populists as backward-thinking “gibbering idiots” who “hate
prosperity.”159 In his rhetoric one can see a common theme which ran through many similar
critiques of Populism: the idea that those who were not materially successful were themselves
the authors of their condition through laziness or other forms of vice. More recently, scholar
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Richard Hughes argues that this was a thought consistent in the American mythos, as, “If
America offered everyone an equal opportunity… and if capitalism was ordained of God and
rooted in nature, then those who failed to excel in this system had only themselves to blame. 160
This still arguably a rather common assumption in the United States especially on the Christian
right, and it can be easily justified with the tactical use of usually context-less Scriptures like
Jeremiah 29:11, “For I know the plans that I have for you,’ declares the Lord, ‘plans
for prosperity and not for disaster, to give you a future and a hope.” Yet the irony of this
development, specifically in regards to the Populist movement is that many of the Populists were
far-more theologically conservative than their Eastern coastal counterparts. Many of them, in
fact, could be labeled as Fundamentalists who denied these ideas which would later be labeled as
the “prosperity gospel.”161
Ultimately, the legacy of the Populists is still ambiguous, but after traversing through
this interpretative jungle, it seems like Laurence Goodwyn’s and more later, Christopher Lasch’s
positions on the Populists, are the closest to reality, as they suggest, along with many Populist
writings themselves, that civic virtue through “popular self-education” was a primary concern of
the movement.162 Thus, certain versions of the Populist movement did represent, in some sense, a
genuine challenge to the American political system. The Populists radical conception was “…the
idea that workable small-unit democracy is possible within large-unit systems of economic
production.”163 This was made even more radical by Lasch’s claim that the views of the
160
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Populists were also “…alien to the shared presumptions of ‘progress’ that unite capitalists and
communists in a religious brotherhood.”164
Ultimately, there would be reform that would be inspired from both of these movements,
yet one could argue that much of it would prove to more form than substance, a trend that would
only continue throughout the course of American political history. Change itself would become
institutionalized, which meant that genuine change was no longer possible.
One of the other attempt major attempts at reform and change during the Gilded Age was
the Social Gospel Movement. There was definitely an intricate link between liberal Protestantism
and the reform efforts of this period. One cannot deny that in some sense, the Social Gospel was
a form of “civic virtue,” but more of the form of civic virtue which is “actions based” and not
necessarily the civic virtue which illumines the path to self-governance. Henry May argues that
“No set of doctrines has ever impelled more people to help their neighbors, to clean up slums
build schools and playgrounds.”165 The theoretical framework for the social gospel movement
came from several sources.
Walter Rauschenbusch, one of the leaders of the movement, much like many other city
reformers, was very stirred by the decrepit living conditions that many in his inner-city flock had
to endure. Lincoln Steffen’s and Jacob Rii’s famous descriptions of Gilded Age life for the urban
poor both heavily concur with Rauschenberg’s experience. Gary Dorrien writes, “His
[Rauschenbusch’s] congregants lived in squalid five-story tenements that pressed more than
twenty families into each building. His heart broke at the malnutrition and the diseases of the
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children, and their funerals.”166 Rauschenbusch would come to realize the necessity of a faith
that also was deeply involved in efforts for societal change. Hence, “If people suffered because
of politics and economics, then authentic kingdom preaching had to deal with politics and
economics.”167 Yet Rauschenbusch would eventually take this even further, and while he was in
Germany in the late 1890s, the primary shift occurred in his mind which would come to be the
theological foundation for the social gospel. Rauschenbusch now believed that “…the kingdom
was not merely a major part of Jesus’s teaching; it was the controlling center.” 168 What this
meant was that no longer was social action something which was an extension of the Christian
Gospel, rather social action and the Gospel were now one in the same. 169 Rauschenbusch’s
writings, that would prove to be extremely influential, flowed from this basic assumption. In
these writings, Rauschenbusch offered some cogent critiques to the United States economic
system, echoing those previously discussed in the labor movement who saw the degrading
effects of capitalism on older, more traditional forms of life. Rauschenbusch, partially echoing
Marx and Engels, argued that with the advent of capitalism, “Thus went the old independence
and the approximate equality of the old life.” 170 Yet, Rauschenbusch, was no luddite, and he
believed, as with Marx,171that the new industrial capabilities could ensure the good life, only
though if they were to be cooperatively owned. 172 Furthermore Rauschenbusch would argue that
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capitalism only allowed the American citizen to enjoy half of his natural rights in a liberal
system. “A modern American worker is a rights-bearing citizen in the political sphere…but in
the economic sphere the same worker has ‘only himself’.” 173 Ultimately, Social gospeler’s and
reformers such as Rauschenbusch, rightly exhorted their fellow citizens to look “…beneath the
glitter of their booming society…,” 174 yet many of their actual solutions to these deep-seated
problems, would only assist in increasing material well-being, and would ultimately not recoup
the lost political sovereignty of many citizens.
As the nineteenth century came to an end, there was actually quite a high level of
ostensible optimism that had spread among those in the more middle to upper class sections of
American society. Despite the acknowledged presence of various social issues, many espoused
the general position was that these issues could and would be improved. There were also other
reasons for enthusiasm towards the future. In just a few short years, communication and
transportation had been revolutionized, shrinking the world, and creating numerous possibilities
for increased self-liberation or national greatness. This optimism was conjoined with a sense of
universal morality that had been able to remain relatively unscathed from the disruptions which
had earlier occurred to traditional religious belief. The body remained, even though the soul had
long departed. Henry May summarizes this general sentiment, “The progress of the world was
chief proof of its underlying goodness; the eternal moral truths pointed out a direction for social
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change.”175 Yet, there was trouble beneath the surface, and not all was as it seemed, as fin de
siècle sentiments were still present, especially for those in the younger generations.
As with much of current politics, one could characterize the US political system during
this time as relatively uniform in foundation and structure, and only dissimilar in window
dressing. In other words, both sides on the US political aisle essentially had the same underlying
assumptions and beliefs despite superficial differences. Hence, where there was disagreement
was in methods and application. As for the belief in universal, evolutionary progress, there was
fundamental agreement between both sides. 176 Those who could be labeled as “conservative”
considered a laisse faire approach was preferable as they believed that any form of market
interference would be an impediment to progress. 177 For those who could be labeled as “liberal,”
it was believed that the process of progress itself could be in a sense “sped up” by humans
wielding their agency and inserting themselves into the historical process through active reform
via government intervention. 178 Thus, the status quo became engrained.
All these factors begat many consequences which can only be addressed partially herein.
In politics, words in pieces of legislation and in political rhetoric, became less practically
meaningful and symbolic for the average American. Politics furthermore became sectioned off
into its own life-sphere, replete with its own customs, traditions, and language that was exclusive
to its practitioners. The meaning of civic virtue itself was becoming more and more obfuscated,
as less and less opportunities were given to the average citizen to perform his civic duties on a
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grander scale. By the mid-twentieth century, the American citizen was essentially powerless. C.
Wright Mills opened up his classic work The Power Elite, by opining that for common men,
“‘Great changes’ are beyond their control, but affect their conduct and outlook none the less.” 179
Thus if civic virtue does indeed mean the character, habits, and dispositions which are necessary
for self-governance, then civic virtue was becoming completing nonexistent. The United States
citizen was much less a citizen and more of a subject. This was the absolute inversion of the
American ideal.
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Chapter 4: The Fate of American Civic Virtue
Man is constantly being assured today that he has more power than ever before in history, but his
daily experience is one of powerlessness.
-Richard Weaver180

Because the good men of this land have largely failed to do their duty, our politics are what they
are.
-The Dawn181

While this work is primarily focused on the state of civic virtue during the Gilded Age, it
is important to briefly discuss some of the reforms of that period and to introduce the reforms
during the Progressive Era. Evaluating the reforms of the late nineteenth and early twentieth
century is a difficult task. On one hand, there was some level of quantifiable reform in nearly
every spectrum of life. The historically muddled task is determining whether such reforms
merely “looked good” on paper and in conventional history, or if they fundamentally changed
American society in ways not necessarily reflected in statistical analysis.
What ultimately would plague reformers was their dual impulses to allow for as much
individual freedom as possible, but on the other hand their deep distrust and distain for those
perceived to be inferior or incapable. The final product of this conflict would the “culture of
expertism” which has only increased in size and scope since the Progressive era. Thus, in their
attempts to “clean up” the corruption and vice which America’s urban centers were increasingly
displaying, the reformers used methods which were at best a misguided form of paternalism, and
at worst an obsessive micromanagement. To ensure that human passion did not get in the way,
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the Progressives attempted to reform based off scientific rigor and objective rules. In other
words, scientific efficiency became the basis for reform. This rules-based approach demonstrated
a “…folly of thinking that rigid rules and procedures are the best way of achieving…” reform. 182
Extreme legalism, and the codifying of every life-sphere was a poor substitute for genuine civic
virtue, which had become a less and less possible reality given the prevailing social, political,
intellectual, and spiritual conditions. The solution, a pragmatic and scientific approach to
governance guided by dispassionate experts, would in the long run turn the United States in
labyrinth of paperwork and arbitrary rules. Such an approach was rooted in a deep distrust for
public opinion, which had indeed become much less informed. This general ignorance of the
American public was in part a cause of this “culture of expertism”, and therefore one cannot
indict the Progressives without indicting the people themselves.
In popular narratives both then and now, the progressive movement has been framed as a
concerted effort to wrest political and economic power from the few who held it at the time –
“railroads, large corporations, and party bosses” – and return it to the common man. 183 Yet in
reality, the opposite occurred. It is true that a cursory glance at the historical record would
indicate that significant political reform occurred during in the early twentieth century. Yet this
reform was all form and no substance, a trend that would only continue throughout the course of
American political history. The eventual, long-term result of Progressive reform was more a
victory for financial elites rather than downtrodden citizens. Gabriel Kolko’s revisionist account
of the Progressive Era argues that progressive reforms were instituted to stabilize capitalism and
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thus shield various corporations from competition, even though it was presented as the
opposite.184 Change itself had become institutionalized.
Complete and total self-liberation, the end goal of liberalism and its associate
movements, is impossible. One of the many paradoxes of life under the sun is that man,
overflowing with self-interest, cannot live without other men. This fact poses a challenge to the
hegemonic idea of the primacy of atomistic individualism in American life. Additionally, the
challenges, and responses to those challenges, of the late 2010s and early 2020s portend an
upcoming postliberal order. The contradictions inherent in the liberal belief of absolute
individual liberation cannot hold under the weight of these events and happenings. Such a reality
necessitates those in the West to take a very hard look at their unquestioned assumptions and
their own history, which, if done, will prompt many questions. The main question would be
“Where do we go from here?” The truth is that the answer to this question lies not within history
itself, but in the One outside of it. With this acknowledgement, then, and only then, can society
be governed by a “politics of virtue.”185
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